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THE PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL POWER OF
BALKIN'S "ORIGINAL MEANING"
Dawn Johnsen*
Jack Balkin's Abortion and Original Meaning should be
widely read and debated, not only by constitutional theorists but
by a broad range of those who care about his subject: how the
United States interprets its foundational document. How should
those who are part of that interpretive enterprise-from federal
judges to "we the people"-go about the process of defining our
core constitutional principles and who we are as a nation? And
how should that interpretive process apply to one of the most
controversial issues of the day, abortion?
Constitutional theory, of course, is the subject of an enormous scholarly literature, and others have agreed with Balkin
that the Constitution is both binding law that requires fidelity
(over preferred policy outcomes) and "living" in its application
to changing times. One obvious question for Balkin-and for
anyone writing in the area-is what he adds to the existing literature. By standard measures familiar to legal academics, he contributes much: a jurisprudentially strong interpretive theory that
emphasizes the centrality of original meaning from what can be
described as a progressive perspective. Fidelity to the Framers
does not require, as some originalists suggest and some progressives fear, freezing constitutional norms to the narrow original
expectations of the Framers. Nor does a living Constitution approach require disregarding the Framers' original meaning.
This comment, though, explores a more unorthodox and indirect contribution: the articulation of a progressive interpretive
methodology that is not only strong jurisprudentially, but that
also offers the potential for relatively broad accessibility and political efficacy, for the Constitution outside the courts and the
* Professor ol Law, Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington. I am vcy
grateful to my excellent research assistants Jcff Macey and Aaron Stucky and for helpful
comments from Daniel 0. Conkle, Robert Post and H. Jefferson Powell.
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constitutional influences of social movements. In a working democracy, constitutional theory has import beyond academia.
That import is particularly pronounced at a time when influential elected officials continue a decades-long assault on "activist"
judges, with charges that those who protect constitutional rights
and liberties seek illegitimately to "make" (as in "make up")
rather than "interpret" law. The nation has special need for
prominent scholars who can develop and explain principled constitutional theory in popularly accessible and politically effective
terms. Balkin's prior work establishes his preeminence in this regard, and this latest article brings his abilities to the pressing and
enduring issues of the role of original meaning and the constitutional status of abortion bans.
The issues of originalism and abortion illustrate that academics on the ideological right have excelled at reaching beyond
academic circles to shape politics and public policy. As Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel have recently observed, the
extensive scholarly criticism of originalism since its rise in the
1980's, while impressive on its own terms, is incomplete in its inattention to the actual terms of originalism's remarkable successes. The literature exposes the deficiencies of originalism as
an interpretive methodology, most notably its inaccuracies and
inconsistencies, and quite convincingly devastates its jurisprudential claims. Yet originalism's enormous influence has come
less as a theory of jurisprudence than as a highly persuasive political ideology that inspires passionate political engagement.
The right uses both originalism and abortion to far greater political advantage than public opinion polls would predict, including to impugn the constitutional fidelity of "nonoriginalists" and
supporters of Roe v. Wade.2
Progressives will benefit from Abortion and Original Meaning, whether or not they are steeped in constitutional theory. As
they read, they will feel their spirits soar and at times will silently
(perhaps audibly) cheer. They will be empowered as Balkin provides deepened understanding and improved ways of articulating
their constitutional views. Balkin eloquently demonstrates that
progressives, no less than originalists of the traditional stripe,
care about fidelity to the constitutional text, adherence to consti1. Robert Post & Rcva Sicgel, Originalism As A Political Practice: The Right's
Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); see generally Dawn Johnsen, Lessons from the Right: Progressive Constitutionalism for the Twenty-First Century, I HARV.
L. & POL'Y REV. 239 (2007).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tutional principle, and respect for the intent of the Framers of
that great document. And his approach to original meaning encourages belief that the Constitution indeed is a great document,
susceptible of principled interpretations that promote equality
and liberty for all.
Originalists of the traditional stripe from the ideological
right no doubt will remain unmoved. They will contest Balkin's
premise that original meaning and living constitutionalism are
compatible-that originalists have fostered a false dichotomy between the two by conflating the original meaning of the constitutional text (which Balkin says must constrain interpretation) and
the text's "original expected application" (endorsed by originalists like Justice Antonin Scalia). Originalists certainly will oppose Balkin's attempted appropriation of the phrase "original
meaning." They will disagree especially with Balkin's view of the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Privileges or Immunities Clauses as protective of reproductive liberty. Balkin anticipates such responses and notes that,
to the extent they come, he will have succeeded in structuring
the debate on appropriate terms.
Balkin's "text and principle" methodology should be evaluated in comparison with the longer litany of interpretive sources
and methods that the Court traditionally uses and progressives
typically endorse. That list includes: text, structure, original
meaning, original expected application (to use Balkin's phrase),
judicial doctrine, political branch practice, settled expectations,
consequences, and the nation's tradition, ethos and values.'
Balkin describes his approach more simply: "constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to the original meaning of the Constitution and to the principles that underlie the text."'
3. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12-13 (1991)
(describing six modalities of constitutional argument: historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, ethical, and prudential); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON
WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY AND POLITICS 208 (2012) ("In constitutional

argument it is legitimate to invoke text, constitutional structure, original meaning, original intent, judicial precedent and doctrine, political-branch practice and doctrine, settled
expectations, the ethos of American constitutionalism, the traditions of our law and our
people, and the consequences of differing interpretations of the Constitution.");
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85 (3rd cd. 2000)) (theorizing

that appropriate modes of constitutional interpretation include "text, structure, history,
the nation's values or ethos, and doctrine").
4. Jack Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293
(211)7). Balkin continues, "Itihe task of interpretation is to look to original meaning and
underlying principle and decide how best to apply them in current circumstances." Id
Some principles follow directly from particular text, while others must be inferred from
the constitutional structure (such as separation of powers and democracy). Fidelity to
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The disparity between the approaches is not as great as it
might initially seem, because Balkin would allow appropriate
consideration of these other sources (including original expected
application) as aids to interpretation. He would recognize, however, a hierarchy of methods in that only text and principle (interpreted in light of original meaning) control interpretation and
are essential to constitutional fidelity. Balkin explains the secondary status of other methods in part by urging that we view citizens, not courts, as the standard interpreters when considering
what constitutes constitutional fidelity. This point is fundamental, and in my view accurate. Constitutional interpretation by
judges raises special institutional considerations, including the
need for additional interpretive constraints. Thus, courts employ
a range of doctrinal devices that constrain their authority and
role, such as deferential standards of review, political question
doctrine, and standing and other jurisdictional requirements.
Presidents and Congress also play important interpretive roles,
though they face their own constraints. In place of the typical
court focus, Balkin emphasizes the substantial work of social and
political movements-"the lifeblood of fidelity to our Constitution"-as "[e]ach generation makes the Constitution their Constitution by calling upon its text and its''5principles and arguing
about what they mean in their own time.
Balkin's emphasis on text and principle is very appealing,
and debate about its relative merits will surely advance constitutional theory. For now, I want to return to Post and Siegel's observation that originalism has succeeded primarily as a political
ideology that has motivated political engagement and action.
Progressives, too, must consider the political viability of how
they respond to originalism and how they articulate their preferred interpretive methodology. On this score, "text and principle" shows promise. The longer standard litany of sources and
methods to my mind is clearly correct and within the jurisprudential mainstream. With a nonexpert audience, though, it risks
creating the (mis)impression of inappropriate indeterminacy and
unprincipled discretion left to the interpreter, who can pick and

text requires consideration of principle as well because, although some constitutional text
is relatively concrete and specific, other text describes relatively abstract and general
concepts. Balkin's approach is consistent with the relatively familiar argument that when
the Framers chose to use text that describes abstract and general concepts, they typically
sought to embody abstract and general principles that must be fleshed out by later generations.
5. Id. at 312, 301.
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choose to suit desired ends-and, in the case of conflict, even
disregard text and principle.
By emphasizing which among the methods are essential to
constitutional fidelity and affirming the centrality of original
meaning (properly defined), Balkin reclaims for progressives
both the document and the Framers. Progressive interpretive
theory arguably cannot succeed-and should not succeedeither jurisprudentially or politically unless it in some measure
acknowledges the primacy of the text and the relevance of original meaning.
Balkin's popularly accessible narrative is not only politically
viable, but potentially politically superior to originalism. Justice
Scalia, like many originalists, tolerates for the sake of stability
some decisions that he believes the Court as an initial matter decided incorrectly by failing to adhere to the original expected
application. Balkin explains that this frequent need to resort to
stare decisis reveals a fatal inadequacy of originalism:
Our political tradition does not regard decisions that have secured equal rights for women, greater freedom of speech, federal power to protect the environment, and federal power to
pass civil rights laws as mistakes that we must unhappily retain; it regards them as genuine achievements of American
constitutionalism and sources of pride. These decisions are
part of how and why we understand ourselves to be a nation
that has grown freer and more democratic over time. No interpretive theory that regards equal constitutional rights for
women as an unfortunate blunder ...can be adequate to our
history as a people.'
This is but one of many statements in Abortion. and Original
Meaning that will cause progressive readers, beaten down from
years of rhetoric about illegitimate judicial activism, enthusiastically to jot in the margins, and think "this is the America I know
and love." Under Balkin's theory, revered judicial rulings that
protect cherished rights and expand political inclusion for those
previously disfavored were correct when issued and are consistent with original meaning. They should be celebrated as American constitutionalism at its best, not excused as unfortunate but
sturdy precedents.
The article's promise for political influence is enhanced by
its application of the "text and principle" approach to Roe v.

6.

Id. at 298-99.

422

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 24:417

Wade and the constitutional status of abortion, originalists' most
frequent target. Even many self-described progressives and liberals find Roe difficult to defend. As in the case of originalism,
constitutional arguments about the government's authority to
restrict abortion have reached beyond academia, far more than
the vast majority of constitutional issues, to have profound political impact. As Supreme Court cases go, Roe is widely recognized and debated. Scholars are joined by anti-abortion advocates and elected officials in relentless attacks that claim the
right to privacy is unsupported by either the constitutional text
or the Framers' intent-and that those who disagree are unprincipled, anti-democratic judicial activists.
Balkin's compelling account of why what he terms the
"conventional wisdom" on Roe is wrong will inspire and empower supporters of Roe and legal abortion, who desperately
need improved articulations of the right that can persuade not
only (or primarily) courts but also political actors and ultimately
the public. Unlike Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,7 in which the Court eloquently described the nature of the right at stake but rested as well on arguments from
stare decisis, Balkin provides an entirely affirmative account of
why the original meaning of the Constitution is best interpreted
as affording women protection from abortion bans. He explains
why Roe is best viewed as entirely faithful to constitutional "text
and principle."
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not use the
word "privacy" (a point Roe opponents repeat ad nauseam), it
does speak of "liberty" in the Due Process Clause, which the
Court has interpreted as protecting private decision-making regarding childbearing. Balkin personally finds greater protection
for the right to choose abortion in the original meaning of the
Citizenship, Privileges or Immunities, and Equal Protection
Clauses. Those clauses, which on his reading the Court has misinterpreted and underenforced, guarantee a right of equal citizenship that prohibits the state from subordinating women or assigning them second-class status based on their capacity to
become pregnant. For some contemporary, especially non-legal,
audiences, this emphasis on women's equality and sexual subordination will not directly translate into political messages as persuasive as the traditional focus on privacy and individual liberty.
But Balkin's discussion of alternative sources of the abortion
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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right and how the Court came to locate it in the Due Process
Clause helps provide a more complete and accurate picture of
the nature of the right and its import to women- a picture of the
right, moreover, that is grounded in the politically powerful and
legitimizing language of text and original meaning.8
I do question one aspect of Balkin's analysis: his suggestion
that we should view the abortion right as two separate rights.
Other commentators, including Supreme Court Justices, have
considered the right in its component parts.' That exercise can
prove extremely useful. The particular division Balkin endorses,
though, seems to me theoretically incomplete and possibly politically and practically inadequate. His first right, "a woman's
right not to be forced by the state to bear children at risk to her
life or health," essentially tracks the Court's consistent recognition to date, from Roe to Casey to Stenberg,"' that the government may not impose on women significant threats to their
health. A woman therefore must be permitted to terminate a
pregnancy at any point, even after fetal viability, if her health is
endangered. This aspect of the right does seem valuable to isolate-for courts, for legislatures, and for public opinion.
Balkin describes the second right as "a woman's right to decide whether or not to become a mother and assume the obligations of parenthood." He would have the courts protect this right
against state-enforced motherhood only for a limited period of
pregnancy: "it requires only that women have a reasonable time
to decide whether to become mothers and have a fair and realistic opportunity to make that choice."
Lost in this division is a complete sense of the physical intrusion that abortion bans inflict on women's bodily integrity.
The first right does reflect an aspect of bodily integrity but is limS. This analysis is valuable beyond abortion as a case study that illustrates the
general nature ol judicial doctrine, including doctrine's inherent limitations and its distinctiveness from the document.
9. For example, Justice Harry Blackmun, concurring in part and dissenting in part
in Casey, described the following two ways in which abortion restrictions violate women's
constitutional rights: "First, compelled continuation of a pregnancy infringes upon a
woman's right to bodily integrity by imposing substantial physical intrusions and significant risks of physical harm." 505 U.S. at 927 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part). "Further, when the State restricts a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, it deprives a woman of the right to make her own decision about reproduction and family planning-critical life choices .... Because motherhood has a
dramatic impact on a woman's educational prospects, employment opportunities, and
self-determination, restrictive abortion laws deprive her of basic control over her life."
Id. at 927-28.
10. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2110).
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ited to specific threats to a woman's health or life beyond the
standard threats that accompany pregnancy and childbirth-for
example where a pregnant woman develops cancer. The second
right deals with parenthood and the "life-altering set of responsibilities that come with being a parent," responsibilities that
pertain equally when a child is adopted. This right would protect
against a government effort to force women (or men) to adopt
children in need of homes, or possibly even to take in foster
children in need of emergency care. It does not, however, capture the physical and psychological harms inflicted on women by
government-mandated pregnancy and childbearing, including
the significant health risks that accompany even "normal" pregnancies.
A more complete conception of this second right, one that
reflects the intrusion on women's bodily integrity as well as the
life-altering social responsibilities, I think also suggests that the
right is best understood as existing for the entire duration of
pregnancy rather than only for a reasonable time in which to
make a decision. The right exists throughout pregnancy, but a
separate question remains whether the government possesses an
adequate justification for overriding that right. Balkin and I essentially end up at the same bottom line, though. I think that the
Court in Roe and Casey dealt well with the government's competing interest in protecting fetal life by allowing abortion bans
(with health exceptions) after the point of fetal viability. Balkin's
formulation is helpful in thinking about how this balance is
struck, because the viability line does allow women a reasonable
time to decide whether to accept, indeed in many cases to welcome, the bodily changes and also the future parenting obligations." Balkin would prefer a "discourse shaping" approach that
leaves greater room for legislative involvement in selecting the
point in pregnancy after which abortion would be illegal. Although I see the theoretical appeal in this alternative (especially
if the Court had adopted it back in 1973), I have serious concerns about moving to this approach decades later. In the end
Balkin agrees that, at this point in the doctrinal development, it
is best to stick with the viability line.
The principal potential inadequacy I see in the way Balkin
presents his two rights is that he considers only laws that would
11. Ci: Casey, 5)5 U.S. at 87) ("The viability linc also has, as a practical matter, an
clement of fairness. In some broad sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act
before viability has consented to the State's intervention on behalf of the developing
child.").
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ban abortion, and not the literally hundreds of state laws that
impose a myriad of obstacles and restrictions on women and
abortion providers. Anti-abortion legislators and advocates hope
such laws will ultimately render their states, and ultimately the
nation, "abortion free" just as effectively as would an abortion
ban. Indeed, the strategy is working: as of 2007, in three states,
only one abortion provider remains, and nationwide the number
of providers has been steadily declining since 1973.12 Balkin does
acknowledge the existence of some restrictive abortion laws
short of bans-namely, mandatory waiting periods and parental
consent requirements- not to assess their constitutionality, but
only in the context of considering what would be a reasonable
period after which a state could criminalize abortion in accordance with his second right. By Balkin's own, possibly overly optimistic, estimation, even if the Court were to overrule Roe expressly and completely, only up to a dozen states would outlaw
abortion. Balkin's analysis, I think, would be more theoretically
complete and practically helpful if it was expanded to address as
well the types of abortion restrictions that are most threatening
to women today, and that would remain most threatening in
most states even if the Court were to overrule Roe and uphold
abortion bans.
As this discussion of Balkin's abortion analysis illustrates,
"text and principle" leaves substantial room for disagreement
about its application to particular issues, even among progressives. That indeterminacy may lead to charges of jurisprudential
and political inadequacy. Balkin doesn't purport to resolve all
applications, and far more than a persuasive interpretive methodology is needed for ultimate political success. He does,
though, seek to structure debate. Some progressives will question whether such indeterminacy is best debated on grounds initially staked out by, and now closely associated with, ideological
conservatives-to my mind, a close question. Post and Siegel, for
example, caution progressives who would embrace a version of
originalism, and warn against "a method of interpretation that
strongly privileges the history of constitutional lawmaking over
the experience of living under the Constitution ." 3 Whether or
12. Somc of the most insidious examples are described by abortion advocates as
"TRAP" laws, [or "targeted rcgulation of abortion providers." Under the guise of' rcasonable-sounding, but medically unnecessary, health regulations, states require extremely expensive remodeling of abortion clinics, regulations that essentially require the
building of small hospitals and as a practical matter result in the closing of clinics.
13. Robert Post & Rcva Siegel, How Liberals Need io Approach Constitutional
Theory, THE NEW REPUBLIC ONLINE, Sept. 18, 21)7.
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not one ultimately finds Balkin's precise formulation convincing,
it powerfully highlights essential aspects of a successful interpretive methodology.
In emphasizing the potential political and public policy
value of Abortion and Original Meaning, I do not denigrate its
inherent value or interest to the more traditional law review audience, among whom it was widely read and well regarded even
while in draft form. I do seek to encourage that audience to consider more intentionally the potential impact of this and other
scholarship beyond academia. Progress and even transformation
on policy matters related to constitutional interpretation clearly
can be aided by academic scholarship, as evidenced by the ideological right's successes on these very issues of originalism and
abortion. Abortion and OriginalMeaning should be widely read
and also summarized and translated-for it is quite long-to
reach even broader audiences. It has the potential to help unmask the hypocrisy behind vacuous sound bites such as "strict
constructionist" and "judicial activist"-and to advance popular
understanding of how we should determine constitutional meaning. Fidelity to "text and principle," consistent with original
meaning (properly defined), is one appropriate and appealing
basis on which to debate progressive constitutionalism.

